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YOUTH VIOLENCE, GUNS, AND THE
ILLICIT-DRUG INDUSTRY
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN*
I. THE GROWING CONCERN OVER CRIME
Crime has become an issue of increasing importance to the
American public. A growing fear of crime seems to pervade the na-
tion and contributes to crime being reported as the nation's "most
serious problem."' This Article examines some empirical aspects of
changing crime patterns in recent years and identifies the nature of
these changes more precisely than is possible from a typical press re-
port or political debate. This Article concludes that the predominant
change in homicide is attributable to a dramatic growth in youth
homicide beginning in the mid-1980s and attributes that growth to
the recruitment of young people into illicit drug markets. Because
those markets are illegal, the participants must arm themselves for
self-protection, and the resulting "arms race" among young people re-
sults in a more frequent resorting to guns as a major escalation of the
violence that has often characterized encounters among teenage
males.
A. CHANGING CRIME RATES
If one were to ask the American people in 1994 how the crime
problem has changed in recent years, most would respond that crime
has been growing incessantly worse, especially violent crime. This
view is reflected in the "single biggest problem" rating. However prev-
alent this view may be, it is unfounded. Most Americans would be
* H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity. The author would like to express his appreciation toJonathan Caulkins,Jacqueline
Cohen, Daniel Nagin, Kenneth Powell, Richard Rosenfeld, andJeffrey Roth for discussions
and suggestions related to this paper.
1 Richard L. Berke, CrimeJoins Economic Issues as Leading Worry, Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1994, at Al (A New Yor* Times/CBS poll asked respondents to identify "the single
biggest problem facing the nation." The leading issue was violent crime, identified by 19%
of the respondents, with an additional 2% citing guns. The next issue of greatest concern
was health care-a subject of considerable public discussion at the time-cited as such by
15% of the respondents. Only 3% cited drug abuse.).
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suprised to see Figure la,2 the graph of the most serious violent
crimes, murder and robbery, and Figure lb, the graph of robbery and
burglary,3 over the twenty-two year period from 1972 to 1993.4 These
graphs present a picture of oscillation around a strikingly flat trend.
The crime rates have generally remained within a fairly confined
range of 200 to 250 per 100,000 population for robbery, and eight to
ten per 100,000 for murder. Both the murder and the robbery rates
peaked in about 1980, declined through the early 1980s, and then
climbed again during the late 1980s with the intensification of the
crack epidemic and the "war on drugs." Over this period, there is no
statistically significant trend for murder, a slight upward trend for rob-
bery (an annual increase of 3.0 robberies per 100,000, or 1.35% of the
2 Note that the murder rate in Figure la is scaled up by a factor of 25 and the burglary
rate in Figure lb is scaled down by a factor of 6 to make the patterns over time
comparable.
3 The data for Figure 1 are taken from FEDERAL BuREAu oF INvESTIGATION, CRIME IN
THE UNrTED STATES: UNIORM CRIME REPORTS [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REP. in foot-
notes and UCR in text]. These reports are published annually by the FBI on the basis of
reports by police departments, which, in turn, are based primarily on the reports of crimes
by victims, with the obvious exception of murder.
4 Seeing this long-term pattern is much more useful than the simple year-to-year up-or-
down shifts that are usually offered by the press. The typical journalistic practice of report-
ing an up-tick on page one and a down-tick on a back page undoubtedly contributes to














1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Year
mean robbery rate over the twenty-two years), and a slight downward
trend for burglary (an annual decrease of 10.4 burglaries per 100,000,
or 0.77% of the mean burglary rate over twenty-two years).
The oscillatory pattern for the two major bellwether violent
crimes, murder and robbery, is quite similar. Both reached a peak in
about 1980 as the baby boomers began to emerge from the high-crime
ages, and began a downward trend through the early 1980s. That
downward trend was anticipated because of demographic considera-
tions,5 and was expected to continue until the early 1990s. Unfortu-
nately, however, that downward trend was interrupted and turned
upward through the late 1980s, probably as a consequence of the drug
epidemic. In more recent years, both rates dropped from 1991 to
1992, but then murder increased while robbery decreased from 1992
to 1993.
The pattern for burglary tracked that for robbery rather closely
until the late 1980s, when burglary did not turn up, but continued in a
slow decline. If the crime rise in the late 1980s was driven by the
growth in the drug market, and if the crimes of theft were strongly
influenced by the need to get money to buy drugs, then the diver-
5 See Alfred Blumstein et al., Demographically Disaggregated PrJeaions of Prison Popula-
tions, 8J. CGaM.Jusr. 1 (1980).
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gence might be explained as follows: a robbery is a quick and conve-
nient way for a drug user not earning his money from selling drugs to
get his drug money. In contrast, a burglar still has to dispose of his
property, through a fence or otherwise, and users in urgent need of
drugs may choose to avoid that complication.
B. DEMOGRAPHIC-SPECIFIC RATES
The aggregate rates reflect a combination of changes in the
crime-committing propensity of particular demographic groups and
changes in demographic composition, particularly groups with rela-
tively high crime involvement. One can partition these factors by ex-
amining changes in demographic-specific rates. The three principal
measured demographic variables-age, race, and gender-account
for large differences in the involvement in crime. The measure that
accounts for the greatest difference is gender, but it is the least useful
to explore because gender composition is not changing appreciably.
Age, on the other hand, is one of the most important factors affecting
crime rates and has been changing significantly in recent years.
Therefore, it is useful to examine age-specific crime rates. This sec-
tion also explores race, an important factor, especially in violent
crime.
1. Age
Age is so fundamental a construct that its relationship to offenses
is usually designated as the "age-crime curve." These graphs depict
the ratio of the number of people of each age, a, who are arrested for
crime type i, Ai(a), to the total population of that age, 6 Ni(a), as a
function of age.
a. Robbery and Burglary
Figures 2a and 2b contrast the patterns for robbery (scaled up by
a factor of three) 7 and burglary in 1985 and in 1992. First, note that
6 Arrest is most commonly used as the proxy for offenders because the demographic
characteristics of offenders are usually unknown, but are easy to establish for arrestees.
Studies that have compared victim reports of the demographics of offenders with those of
arrestees (for personal crimes like robbery and aggravated assault) find that the two have
tended to be closely related. See, e.g., MichaelJ. Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common
Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc. REv. 93, 93 (1978). The data on age-specific rates are
drawn from the FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, AGE-SPEcIFIC ARREST RATES AND RACE-
SPECIFIC ARREST RATES FOR SELECTED OFFENSES, 1965-1992 (1993).
7 As was done in Figures la and lb, we have scaled up the robbery arrest rates here by
a factor of three to make them comparable with the rates for burglary. Kenneth Powell, of
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, in private communication has raised a
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both crimes peak fairly early at about age seventeen, and fall off rather
quickly, reaching their half-peak points in the early twenties, about
age twenty-one for burglary and about age twenty-four for robbery.
This suggests that people start committing robbery a bit later than
burglary and also finish somewhat later. But clearly careers in both
tend to terminate at a relatively young age.
The pattern for robbery and burglary for 1992 depicted in Figure
2b is very similar to the 1985 picture in Figure 2a. The burglary peak
has dropped somewhat and the robbery peak has increased. This ob-
servation is consistent with the earlier observation about the aggregate
rates in Figure lb and suggests that the change in the age-specific
rates is a principal factor affecting the aggregate rates. Aside from
that shift, however, the two patterns are very similar during the two
periods.
ing reported crime rates for robbery and burglary) and the ratio of three used in Figures 2a
and 2b (comparing age-specific arrest rates for robbery and burglary). This difference is
due to the fact that a reported robbery is about twice as likely to result in an arrest as a
reported burglary. Witness identification in a robbery is more likely because of visual
contact.
[Vol. 86
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Figure 2b
Age-Specific Arrest Rates
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The information of these age-specific patterns is particularly rele-
vant to the various proposals for life sentences without parole for peo-
ple convicted of their third felony, popularly known as the "three
strikes and you're out" law. The age-specific pattern information is
especially relevant if the felonies characterized as "strikes" include
robbery, which they often do since robbery is classified as a "violent"
crime, or burglary because of the few burglars or robbers that appear
at age fifty. "Careers" in these two property crimes are relatively short
and have largely concluded by the time the offender reaches age fifty.
But the life expectancy at age fifty, even in 1991, was still over twenty-
five years,8 especially with the good care a convicted criminal is likely
to get in prison. Strikes should be limited to only serious violent of-
fenses, which display longer criminal careers. 9 The long duration of
8 See U. S. BuREAu or THE CENsus, STAnSTICAL ABSrRACr OF THE U.S. 87, table 115
(1994).
9 SeeAlfred Blumstein &Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal Careers, 237 SciENCE
985 (1987); ALmFED BLUMSTEIN Er AL, CRIMINAL CAREERS AD "CAREER CRIMINALS" 1-12
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the career and the seriousness of the offending patterns might more
reasonably justify the lengthy imprisonment and its associated high
cost, at least on incapacitation grounds.
b. Murder
The trends in the age-specific patterns for murder' ° are in
marked contrast to those for robbery and burglary. Figure 3a presents
two graphs of the shift in age-specific murder rates from 1965 to 1970.
This figure displays a clear, across-the-board increase in the age-spe-
cific rates at all ages, but the pattern in the two years has not changed.
In both cases, there is a rather fiat peak over the ages of eighteen
through twenty-four, with a relatively slow rise compared to Figures 2a
and 2b for robbery and burglary until age eighteen, followed by a rela-
tively slow decline after age twenty-four.
Contrast this situation with Figure 3b, which depicts the same
age-specific arrest rates for murder for the years 1986 and 1992. Here,
10 These, and all other data on age-specific arrest rates, are drawn form FEDERAL Bu-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION, AGE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES AND RAcE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES FOR












0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Age
-- V- 1985 E 1992
there clearly has been a marked change from the fairly flat-peaked
patterns of 1985 (which are very similar to the patterns for 1965 and
1970 of Figure 3a) to the sharp peak that appears at age eighteen and
the surrounding ages in 1992.
A different view of these same age-specific arrest rates is
presented in Figure 4a," which depicts the time trends in the age-
specific rates for the individual ages from eighteen through twenty-
four, the ages around the peaks of the graphs in Figure 3. From 1965
to 1970 there is a general increase in murder arrest rates at all these
ages. Second, the murder arrest rate for ages eighteen through
twenty-four was virtually the same throughout the fifteen year period
of 1970 through 1985; this reflects the relative flatness of the peak of
the graphs for those years in Figure 3.
Third, at age twenty-four there was no strong trend, certainly not
an upward trend, and perhaps a slight downward trend, from 1970
through 1992. Figure 3 confirms that this stability is largely the case
11 In Figure 4, for the years prior to 1985, only the five-year points are shown because
the rates have been reasonably stable. Annual rates are shown for each of the years 1985
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for all ages beyond twenty-four. Indeed, there may even have been a
reduction of the rates for those older ages in 1992.
Finally, there were large increases in the murder arrest rates for
ages younger than twenty-four beginning shortly after 1985, and the
rate of increase was inversely related to age. For age eighteen, the age
displaying the sharp peak in 1992 in Figure 3b, the increase from 1985
to 1992 was over 100%.
This shift to younger ages is displayed even more vividly in Figure
4b, which presents the age-specific arrest rates for murder for each
age, from eighteen down to the combined group of thirteen and four-
teen. For sixteen year olds, for example, whose murder rate prior to
1985 was consistently about half the rate of all the others shown in
Figure 4a, the increase from 1985 to 1992 was 138%. Even the thir-
teen to fourteen year olds, whose rate is still low enough for them not
to be a significant contributor to total murders, more than doubled
their murder rates between 1985 and 1992.
It is clear that, following a period of relative stability from 1970
through 1985, there was a major increase starting just after 1985 in the
murder arrest rate of young people. That increase has not been
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as shown in Figure 4c. Indeed, Figure 4d, which depicts the ratio of
the age-specific murder rates in 1992 to that in 1985, highlights the
fact that all rates for eighteen year olds and younger have doubled,
and those for twenty-five year olds and older have declined.
Much of the growth in the homicide rate in the late 1980s, as
shown in Figure la, is attributable to the spurt in the murder rate by
young people since 1985. This is in marked contrast to the growth
between 1965 and 1970, which was largely an across-the-board in-
crease for all ages.
We can estimate the "excess murders"'
2 attributable to the rise in
the murder rate by the young people covering, for example, the ages
of fifteen through twenty-two, from 1986 through 1992. We estimated
12 We define "excess murders" as those attributable to the increase in the murder arrest
rate above the mean rate for each age that prevailed over the 1970-1985 period. The rates
are based on arrests rather than on actual murders committed, but since the number of
murder arrests in a year is generally roughly equal to the number of murders reported, we
make the calculation by assuming one murder per arrest. Since some murders lead to
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that number to be 18,600 murders for those seven years and eight
ages, or an average of 2,660 murders per year. "Excess murders" turn
out to be a significant component of all the murders in that period.
The average number of excess murders is 12.1% of the annual aver-
age of 22,000 murders in those years, or an increment of 43.2% over
the base number of 6,150 murders attributable to those eight ages if
the pre-1985 rates prevailed. In 1991, these eight ages generated an
excess of 5,330 murders, or 21.6% of the total of 24,703 reported in
the 1991 Uniform Grime Report.13 Eighteen year olds alone contrib-
uted 4,000 of the excess murders in the seven years.
2. Race
The race composition of the U.S. population also has changed in
recent years. While "race" is a variable that is widely measured, it is
important to recognize that "race" has no theoretical meaning in it-
self; it combines effects associated with differences between the races
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in family structure, economic opportunity, community culture, dis-
crimination experiences, and many other individual and group factors
that distinguish races, especially blacks from whites in America.
The crime types in which white and nonwhite rates differ most
markedly are robbery and murder. Figure 5,14 which displays the
homicide offending rate by males in the fourteen to seventeen age
range, highlights the race differences in level and rate of change since
1985. The figure shows the major growth in the rates of homicide
since 1985, especially for young African-American males, and their im-
portant contribution to the growth of the teenage age-specific murder
rate s of Figure 4. The annual rate for whites averaged 8.13 homicides
per 100,000 population from 1976 through 1987 and then climbed
rapidly, almost doubling in the next four years, from a rate of 7.6 per
100,000 in 1987 to 13.6 in 1991. The rates for African-American males
more than doubled in those four years, from 50.4 in 1987 to 111.8 in
1991, and tripled from 32.0 per 100,000 in 1984 to 111.8 in 1991.
14 The data for Figure 5 were generated by Glenn Pierce andJames Fox from the FBI's
Supplementary Homicide Reports, based on reports on individual homicides by police de-
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Figure 615 highlights the fact that victims and perpetrators tend
to be very similar demographically. The growth in the number of
young males as perpetrators of homicide (Figure 5) is clearly reflected
in their growth as victims in Figure 6. Similar growth in victimization
is not reflected for older ages.
C. TWO ASPECTS THAT GENERATE FEAR: STRANGERS AND GUNS
Even though aggregate homicide rates have not increased dra-
matically in recent years (see Figures 1), there have been some impor-
tant shifts in the nature of homicides, and these shifts have
undoubtedly contributed to the growing public concern over crime.
One facet of the shifting pattern is the major increase in the murders
committed by the very young, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. This raises
concern because of the general perception of greater recklessness ex-
hibited by teenagers than by older adults.
15 Based on data from the National Center for Health Statistics, provided by James
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1. Strangers
A second facet causing concern is the greater degree to which
homicide by the young is committed against strangers. Drive-by shoot-
ings are particularly distressing in this regard, because it may appear
that the target was chosen at random and that innocent bystanders
may be hit. Any person's concern about his vulnerability is height-
ened. Since murders have traditionally been seen as a result of con-
flict between intimates, people who are confident about their
intimates' non-violent nature need not become alarmed when that
murder rate goes up. But when there is a sense that more murders
are being committed against strangers, any person can conceive of
himself as a potential target.
Today, murders by young people are more likely to target stran-
gers. For example, analysis of the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Re-
ports for 1991, reveals that 28% of the homicides committed by
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those committed by offenders twenty-five or older were against stran-
gers. Thus, the perception of the increasingly random nature of
murders is reinforced by this difference in the relationship between
offender and victim associated with the shift to the younger offenders.
2. Guns
Another salient factor intensifying concern about homicides is
the increasing involvement of guns in young people's homicides.
Again, this can engender fear because of the sense that young people
are less likely to exercise the necessary restraint in handling danger-
ous weapons, especially rapid-fire assault weapons. Figure 716 presents
the number of homicides committed by juveniles aged ten to seven-
teen that were committed with a gun or by another means, such as
with a knife or by strangulation. From 1976 through 1985, a very
steady average of 59% of the homicides committed by juveniles in-
16 Figure 7 is based on data from a figure in James Fox, "Teenage Males are Commit-
ting Murder at an Increasing Rate," an unpublished report prepared for the National
Center forJuvenile Justice, April 1993, based on data from the FBI's Supplementary Homi-
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volved a gun and the remaining 41% involved some other form of
weapon. 17 From Figure 7, we can see that beginning in 1985, and
especially in 1988, there was a steady growth in the use of guns by
juveniles, with no corresponding upward trend (indeed, a continua-
tion of a slight downward trend) in non-gun homicides.
Those changes are also reflected in Figure 8, which shows the
difference by victim age (which is also a reflection of perpetrator's
age) in the percent of victims killed by guns. For victims over age
thirty, the fraction killed by guns has declined a small but statistically
significant (t=3.2) average of 0.46 percentage points per year over the
sixteen years from 1976 through 1991. But for victims in the fifteen to
nineteen age range, that rate has gone from an average 63% (with no
statistically significant trend) from 1976 through 1984 to a level of
85% in 1992 (an average annual increase of 3.0 percentage points
from 1984 to 1992). For the younger victims, ages ten to fourteen, the
earlier rate was lower (49%, also with no statistically significant trend
17 These estimates were calculated from the data presented in Figure 7.
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from 1976 to 1984), but the growth has been even higher (an average
annual increase of 3.4 percentage points) to a 1992 level of 72% killed
by guns.
II. THE DRUG-CRIME CONNECTION
Drug abuse is an important factor that has affected criminal activ-
ity, especially in the past decade. In a survey' 8 of prisoners conducted
in 1991, 32% of prisoners reported using cocaine or crack regularly
and 15% reported using heroin or opiates regularly. At the time of
the offense that led to their imprisonment, 14% of prisoners were us-
ing cocaine or crack. All these numbers were up appreciably com-
pared to a similar survey conducted five years earlier in 1986. These
are much higher rates than one finds in general population samples
(the NIDA Household Surveys, 19 for example), and so strengthens the
importance of a drug connection to crime rates.
Paul Goldstein 20 has provided a useful taxonomy of the drug-
crime connection as being composed of three components other than
the sale or possession of the drugs themselves:
1) pharmacological/psychological consequences, where the drug itself
causes criminal activity. The most widely recognized connection here is
between alcohol and the violence it induces;
2) economic/compulsive crimes, which are crimes committed by drug users
to support their habit. The most common connection here is the prop-
erty crimes committed by heroin addicts who cannot function in the reg-
ular economy, and who commit crimes to get the money to buy their
drugs; and
3) systemic crime, which includes the crimes committed as part of the
regular means of doing business in the drug industry. This would in-
clude the violence used as a means of dispute resolution between com-
peting sellers or as retribution between a seller and a buyer as a result of
reneging of some form in a drug deal. Reiss and Roth 2' highlight the
18 BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U. S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTIGE, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON
INMATES, 1991, at 21 (1993).
19 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY OF DRUG ABUSE
(published periodically).
20 Paul J. Goldstein, The Drug/VWolence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework, 15 J.
DRUG ISSUES, 493, 493-506 (1985).
21 PANEL ON UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROL OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR Er AL., UNDERSTAND-
ING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 200-205 (AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).
Their development builds largely on several speculations on these issues. James A. In-
ciardi, The Crack/Violence Connection Within a Population of Hard-core Adolescent Of-
fenders, Presented at the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) Technical Review on
Drugs and Violence (Sept. 25-26, 1989); Jeffrey Fagan, The Social Organization of Drug Use
and DrugDealing Among Urban Gangs, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 633 (1989);Jeffrey Fagan & K. Chin,
Violence as Regulation and Social Control in the Distribution of Crack, in DRUGS AND VIOLENCE
(M. de la Rosa et al. eds., 1989); Jeffrey Fagan & K. Chin, Social Processes of Initiation Into











1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Year
varous ways in which this readiness to engage in systemic violence stimu-
lates the individuals involved to engage in violence outide any connec-
tion to the drug industry.
There is a fourth, still broader connection that should also be
considered: the community disorganization effect of the drug industry
and its operations on the larger community. This includes the man-
ner by which the norms and behaviors within the drug industry, which
can become an important activity within some communities, influ-
ences the behavior of others who have no direct connection to the
drug industry. For example, the influence of the widespread preva-
lence of guns among drug sellers may stimulate others in the commu-
nity to similarly arm themselves for self-defense, to settle their own
disputes that have nothing to do with drugs, or to gain respect.2 2
22 Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Streets, 273 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1994, at 80-94.
Anderson highlights the importance of gaining respect as an important motivating factor
in individual behavior in urban ghettos. In a survey of juveniles incarcerated for serious
crimes and of students in center-city high schools, 22% of the students were found to
possess guns, 12% carry them most of the time, and another 23% carry guns "now and
then." Id. The inmates and the students offered similar reasons for carrying guns: 70% of
the inmates and 68% of the students cited protection as the main reason for their most
recent gun acquisition. SeeJ.F. SHEm &J.D. WRIGHT, THE NATION~aL INSTIUTE OFJUS77cE,
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The current drug problem began to emerge in the early 1980s
and then accelerated significantly in the mid-80s. This is reflected in
Figure 9, which presents the rate of arrests for drug offenses,23 which,
especially for nonwhites, primarily African-Americans, started to move
upward in the early 1980s. The drug arrest rate accelerated apprecia-
bly after 1985 with the wide distribution of crack-cocaine, especially in
urban ghettos.
Because of the concern with juvenile violence, it is particularly
interesting to examine the time trends in the drug arrest rate for
juveniles, shown in Figure 10. The figure highlights the major initia-
tion of the recruitment of juveniles, primarily non-whites, into the
drug markets after the introduction of crack. Both Figures 9 and 10
also indicate the degree to which the drug war has focused on non-
whites more than on whites.2 4 According to police involved in drug
23 Arrests for drug offenses obviously confound information on the presence of drug-
market activity with the aggressiveness of police in pursuit of drug offenders.
24 One would hope that would be a reflection of differential involvement in drug mar-
keting, but that does not necessarily appear to be the case. In a household survey con-
ducted by the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), African-Americans represented
19% of those who reported having sold drugs in the last twelve months, but they repre-
sented 64% of the sellers who reported having been arrested for selling drugs. JONATHA
P. CAULKINS & DANIEL McCAFnREY, DRUG SELLERS IN THE HousEoLD POPULATION 10
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enforcement, this difference is magnified because African-American
drug sellers tend to operate in the street where they are vulnerable to
arrest, whereas white sellers are more likely to operate indoors. Fig-
ure 10 also highlights the degree to which non-white juveniles were
recruited into the drug industry beginning in 1985.25 Their amenabil-
ity to such recruitment was undoubtedly enhanced because of their
pessimism-or perhaps even hopelessness-as they weighed their op-
portunities in the legitimate economy, and the increasing demands
for skills in order to gain effective entry.
III. A HYPOTHESIZED PROCESS
In the previous discussion, we have identified three major
changes that have occurred in the short period between 1985 and
1992:
1) homicide rates by youth eighteen and under have more than
doubled, while there has been no growth in homicide rates by
adults twenty-four and older (Figure 4d),
2) the number of homicides juveniles commit with guns has more
than doubled, while there has been no change in non-gun homi-
cides (Figure 7), and
3) the arrest rate of non-white juveniles on drug charges has more
than doubled, while there has been no growth in the drug arrest
rate for white juveniles (Figure 10).
Because these changes are sufficiently focused on young people,
they have not had a major impact on aggregate murder rates (Figures
1). Whatever major impact they may have had is counteracted by the
decline in the murder rate for older people (Figure 4d). The impor-
tant feature of the three doublings highlighted above is that they oc-
curred after a prior fifteen years of relative stability.
One explanation for this array of changes from a stable pre-1985
period to a rapidly deteriorating post-1985 period derives from exam-
ining the changes in the illegal drug markets associated with the intro-
duction of crack cocaine. Crack was introduced at different times in
different parts of the country, but the leading edge of that introduc-
tion appears to have occurred in the larger cities, such as New York
(1993), based on data from NATIONAL INSTrruTE OF DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD
SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION EsTIMATES (1991). These results are complicated by
the many problems with self-report data, non-respondents, and evidence that blacks are
more likely than whites to underreport their involvement in criminal activity. See MIcHAEL
HNDELANG ET AL, MEASURING DELINQUENCY (1981).
25 It is interesting to note from Figure 10 that in 1975 a policy shift reversed the then
rapidly growing drug arrest rate-primarily for marijuana offenses-of whites, whose arrest
rate for drugs exceeded that of non-whites throughout the 1970s.
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and Los Angeles, in about 1985. An important feature of crack is its
low price, which brought into the cocaine market many low-income
people who could only buy it one "hit" at a time; this significantly
increased the number of transactions in those drug markets-both by
the numbers of new buyers and the number of transactions each
buyer engaged in per week.26 In order to accommodate the increased
demand, the drug sellers had to recruit a large number of new sellers.
Juveniles were the natural source of supply for that labor market.
They were probably willing to work more cheaply than adults, partly
because they may be less vulnerable to the punishments imposed by
the adult criminal justice system. Butjuveniles also tend to be daring
and willing to take risks that more mature adults would eschew. The
economic plight of many young urban African-American juveniles,
many of whom see no other comparably satisfactory route to eco-
nomic success or even sustenance, makes them particularly amenable
to the lure of the drug markets.
These juveniles, like many other participants in the illicit-drug in-
dustry, are likely to carry guns for self-protection, largely because that
industry uses guns as an important instrument for dispute resolution.
Also, the participants in the industry are likely to be carrying a consid-
erable amount of valuable product-drugs or money derived from
selling drugs-and are not likely to be able to call on the police if
someone tries to rob them. Thus, they are forced to provide their
own defense; a gun is a natural instrument.
Since the drug markets are pervasive in many inner-city neighbor-
hoods, and the young people recruited into them are fairly tightly
networked with other young people in their neighborhoods, it be-
came easy for the guns to be "diffused" to other teenagers who go to
the same school or who walk the same streets. These other young
people are also likely to ann themselves, primarily for their own pro-
tection, but also because possession of a weapon may become a means
of status-seeking in the community. This initiates an escalating pro-
cess: as more guns appear in the community, the incentive for any
single individual to arm himself increases.
In view of both the recklessness and bravado that is often charac-
teristic of teenagers, and their low level of skill in settling disputes
other than through the use of physical force, many of the fights that
would otherwise have taken place and resulted in nothing more seri-
26 Contrast this with the more typical middle-class consumers of powder cocaine.
Those buyers had an interest in minimizing the number of illegal transactions in which
they engaged, and they had the assets to buy both a reasonable supply in any transaction
and the storage space in which to keep their drugs safely. (I thankJonathan Caulkins for
calling my attention to this feature of the emerging crack markets.).
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ous than a bloody nose can now turn into shootings as a result of the
presence of guns. 27 This may be exacerbated by the problems of so-
cialization associated with high levels of poverty, high rates of single-
parent households, educational failures, and a widespread sense of
economic hopelessness. But those factors have been changing gradu-
ally over the years, and so they cannot readily provide the explanation
for the sharp changes that began to take place in the mid-1980s.
By the time people reach the more mature ages beyond the early
twenties, it appears that they do develop some prudence, are more
cautious even if they are armed, and display greater restraint in the
use of guns.28 Also, because the older adults in their mid-twenties are
not as tightly networked as the younger people, the gun diffusion pro-
cess is likely to be much slower and less widespread. 29
The validity of these hypothesized processes can be tested with
city-level data on drugs, guns, and homicides. Drug markets flour-
ished at different times in different cities, reportedly early in New
York and Los Angeles, later in Washington and Pittsburgh. The sharp
change that took place in the national statistics in about 1985 should
have been displayed in the city-level data shortly after the crack mar-
kets began functioning. In some cities that change should occur
early, and in other cities the change should be later. But, if the above
hypothesized process is correct, the shifts in drug arrests and youth
homicides should occur at about the same time in the same city.
There is additional evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis
of the diffusion of guns from drug markets through the larger com-
munity of juveniles. Figures 11 a and 1 lb present the arrest rates for
murder for adults and juveniles by race. We see from Figure 11a that
since 1980 both white and non-white adults have followed the same
negative trend, even though there has been a large difference in their
involvement in drug markets (see Figure 9). In contrast, the rates for
juveniles-whites and non-whites-have grown markedly since 1985,
when the drug arrest rate for non-whites began to climb. The murder
27 My colleague, Joel Tarr, has called my attention to a passage in ajane Addams' text
in which some thirteen year old boys are taunting each other. JANE ADDAMS, SpiRrr OF
YOUTH AND THE Cn STREETS 61 (1972) (original edition published in 1909). One of them
goes into the house to get a gun. Id. He shoots the taunter through the head and kills
him. Id. Ms. Addams notes that "This tale could be duplicated almost every morning, what
might be merely a boyish scrap is turned into a tragedy because some boy has a revolver."
Id.
28 That inference would be reasonable from the evidence of the decline in the homi-
cide rate in the mid-twenties and beyond.
29 As an alternative possibility, we may be wimessing a cohort effect, and the eighteen
year olds involved in the higher homicide rates may possibly continue their recklessness.

















arrest rate for non-whites has increased by 123% from 7.1 in 1985 to
15.8 per 100,000 in 1992. The rate for whites has also increased mark-
edly, but by a lesser amount-80%, from 1.5 to 2.7 per 100,000. The
fact that there seems to have been no significant involvement of white
juveniles in the drug markets (Figure 10) has not insulated them from
involvement in the homicide growth-one possibility for that growth
is through the suggested gun diffusion process.
We can also examine the time trends of homicide and drug arrest
rates on the same graph, Figure 12. Here, we see that both rates
climbed together from 1985 through 1989, but that there was then
some decline in the drug arrest rates after 1989. But that decline is
not shared by the murder arrest rate. Once the guns are diffused into
the community, they are much more difficult to purge.
IV. SOME POLICY SPECULATIONS
The hypothesis about the diffusion process accounting for the re-
cent growth in youth violence has some important policy implications,
some immediate and some longer-range. One immediate approach
would suggest aggressive actions to confiscate guns from juveniles car-















are almost universal, and require more active and skillful enforce-
ment. The need is particularly salient in those communities where
the homicide rates have risen dramatically, probably coincident with
the location of drug markets. James Q. Wilson has made some con-
crete proposals for pursuing such efforts, including a call for im-
proved devices for detecting guns at a distance.30 Further evidence of
the need to continue gun confiscation comes from an experiment
conducted in Kansas City, Missouri, which assessed the impact of
greater enforcement of laws against the carrying of concealed weap-
ons. In a report of the results of that experiment, Sherman et al. note
that the intensified enforcement in one patrol beat led to an increase
of 65% in gun seizures and a decrease of 49% in gun crimes, with no
comparable improvement (indeed, somewhat of a deterioration) in a
comparison beat.31 This experiment provides a clear indication that
intensified enforcement can make a difference in both increasing gun
confiscation and reducing the number of gun crimes.
It is also important to address the illegal gun markets that are
selling guns to young people. There are important illegal markets
SO James Q. Wilson, just Take Away the Guns, N.Y. TIMEs MAC., March 20, 1994, at 47.
31 See lAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., THE NATiONAL INSTrrruTE oFJusTicE, THE KANSAS
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selling two dangerous products-drugs and guns. The nation has di-
rected major attention and resources (tens of billions of dollars per
year) to the illegal drug markets, but has paid little attention to the
illegal gun markets. It might be easier to make some progress with
the gun markets by using information from the youngster carrying the
gun to work up the distribution chain, and by using the gun serial
number to work down the distribution chain.
One of the more complex aspects of addressing the problem of
youth violence involves the fact that the increase in the juvenile homi-
cide rate is a direct consequence of the operation of drug markets and
their criminalization. This does not, of course, warrant an immediate
call for legalization of drugs; any such policy involves a complex
weighing of the costs of criminalization, of which homicide is but one,
against the probable consequences of greater use of illegal drugs if
they were legalized. Legalization of drugs is a complex issue that
cannot be addressed here other than to note that, if the diffusion hy-
pothesis is correct, then the 18,600 "excess murders" represent one
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The excess murder rate certainly should encourage efforts to diminish
the size of the illegal market. Such efforts could be pursued through
greater investment in treatment, through more effective prevention,
and through finding medical means of providing drugs to certified
addicts, such as those who are supported with SSI payments because
of their addiction. These efforts will not eliminate the illegal markets,
but they should reduce the demand and volume of activity within
those markets.
The nation has yet to undertake a careful assessment of the costs
and benefits of the current policies. Perhaps concern about the ex-
cess murders we continue to experience might contribute to the rec-
ognition of its urgency.
3 2
Perhaps more fundamentally, there continues to be a critical
32 A call for such an assessment was made by former Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders
and was ignored as a result of the aggressive political response. It is an assessment I sug-
gested in my Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology in November
1992, to be carried out by a Presidential Commission with major research support from the
National Academy of Sciences. See Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant, 31 CpIMI-
NOLOGY 1, 16 (1992).
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need to enlist in the legitimate activities of society the large numbers
of people who currently see no role for themselves, and so resist ef-
forts to become socialized into larger society's norms. This is not a
trivial task, but it is not one to which society has paid much attention.
As one stimulus, it is useful to examine Figure 13, the age distribution
of the U.S. population in 1994. The smallest cohort in the crime-rele-
vant ages is the one that is currently eighteen, the age with the sharp-
est increase in age-specific homicide rates (Figure 3). Unless the age-
specific rate is decreased, successive cohorts will be expected to con-
tribute a larger number of murders in the coming years.
